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Abstract 
We investigate the impact of the uncertainty surrounding the United Kingdom’s 
proposed departure from the European Community (“Brexit”) on financial assets. We 
conduct an event study around the November 14th 2018 draft withdrawal agreement. 
Our motivation was that the economic impact of the various political permutations that 
persisted throughout the negotiation period were both measurable and distinct.  The 
probability of each Brexit scenario that was discussed varied over the political 
discourse.  Using opinion poll data we investigate the event impact on both the FTSE 
100 and the UK Pound.  We found that, in accordance with existing academic evidence, 
asset prices discounted the weighted probabilistic economic impact of likely outcomes. 
We observe, however, that this impact was not as immediate as theory suggests. 
Interestingly, currency markets had the greater sensitivity. Our conclusions have 
important implications for the pricing of country risk premia in general and the 
European Union in particular.   
 
Key takeaways: 
1. Asset prices were slow to discount the weighted probabilistic economic impact of 
Brexit risk. 
2. Currency markets had the greater sensitivity to changes in Brexit risk. 
3. Country risk premia can be impacted by perceived changes in custom union. 
Keywords:  
Brexit 
Event study 
EU referendum 
Risk 
Investor sentiment 
Market efficiency 
Country Risk 
 
JEL Classification G10, G11, G12, G14 
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Introduction 
 
Asset prices and risk premia are commonly believed to react to new information. We 
investigate this in the context of the impact of opinion changes on risk premia during the 
uncertainty surrounding the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union (EU) . A 
referendum on its membership was conducted on 23rd June 2016.  The result of the vote was 
considered a shock by most commentators, with some 51.9% in favour of leaving. The two 
year withdrawal process, initiated on 29th March 2017, and subsequently extended, proved 
politically fraught due to the frictions between the public, parliament and the political parties 
who were likewise divided.  The slow and tortuous process, hereafter referred to as “Brexit”, 
dominated political and economic commentary in the United Kingdom. It had a measurable 
impact on the pricing of securities in the FTSE 100 and the Pound using the Stirling currency 
cross rates.  We investigate this and our findings have important implications for the pricing 
of political risk in the face of uncertainty. 
 
According to Hobolt (2016), the outcome of the Brexit referendum, a mandate to the 
government to leave the common market, represents a risk to the political establishment 
across Europe. Kierzwnkowski et al (2016) claim it also represents a risk to both British and 
European economies with potential repercussions to other OECD countries.  The uncertainty 
and political dislocation represent an economic shock that is transmitted both in the precursor 
to the event as well as in its aftermath. Broby (2000) shows that political uncertainty in the 
UK can manifest itself in specific election related risk premia. We use an event study to 
isolate Brexit sentiment changes in both the UK equity and currency markets. 
 
Our investigation has economic relevance.  Political uncertainty can impact consumer and 
business confidence. The effects stem from the potential and real impact of trade tariffs, red 
tape and the curtailment of the freedom of labour. These in turn impact wealth and the level 
of asset prices.  The societal implications justify research into their effects. Our contribution 
is in decomposing the political risk factor over a continuous event time horizon using 
smoothed opinion poll data. We identify a Brexit risk premia which we show to be inefficient 
in its incorporation into market pricing. 
 
 
Background to Brexit 
 
The decision by the United Kingdom to leave the European Union represented a major 
reversal in the expansion of the free trade in goods and services in the region. The only prior 
precedent was the decision by Greenland to leave the former European Economic 
Community.  It is noted, however, that Greenland maintained close ties with Denmark and 
the common market.  The size and integrated nature of the United Kingdom made Brexit into 
an economically influential process and it warrants investigation as potentially other 
European Union countries could consider withdrawal at some point.  It also resulted in a 
reassessment of party politics in the Britain, fundamentally changing the two party system 
with the subsequent rise of the Brexit party. 
 
The European Union is the United Kingdom’s largest trading partner.  Dinghra al (2017), in 
their analysis of the cost benefits of Brexit, show that over 50% of the United Kingdom’s 
imports and 45% of its exports are related to the common market.  The trading of goods and 
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services made the Stirling-Euro and Stirling-Dollar cross rates very sensitive, as shown in 
Exhibit 1. Equity prices were also sensitive, but to a lesser degree.   
 
 
 
Exhibit 1.  This graph represents the Stirling Euro and dollar cross rates for the full sample period, with the exogenous shock of the 
referendum highlighted.  It is worth noting that while Stirling fell after the referendum, share prices recovered. Stirling values did not return 
to their pre-referendum values.  
 
Davies and Studnicka (2018) analysed the cross section of these changes, finding that large 
capitalization companies were more sensitive than small.  They found the market reaction 
was proportionate to the supply side economic shock.  Ramiah, Pham, and Moosa (2017) 
further decomposed the impact on equity markets.  They drilled down into sectors and found 
that the financial sector was hardest hit, with all sectors impacted negatively.   
 
The results of the referendum represent an exogenous shock. The initial expectations were 
that there would be several rounds of discussion and then ratification by parliament.  The 
formal notification under Article 50 was given despite their being no clear roadmap. The 
assumption was made that the default in the event of no agreement would be adoption of the 
rules of the World Trade Organisation.  The failure to reach a consensus agreement during 
the two year notification period contributed to the uncertainty and the Brexit risk premia 
changed with sentiment.  The uncertainty was reflected in changing public opinion towards 
Brexit, as demonstrated in Exhibit 2 which highlights our event study date with a vertical 
line.  
 
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
St
er
lin
g 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 R
at
e
Referendum Date Euro U.S. Dollar
 
5 
 
Exhibit 2. Opinion Poll Responses 
  
Exhibit 2 The first graph shows the response percentages for the opinion poll results over the estimation and 
event period, with the event date highlighted by the vertical line. The second graph shows the poll data has been 
combined so that positive responses (very well and fairly well) and negative responses (fairly badly and very 
badly) have been merged into singular variables.  
 
The initial pre-referendum analysis, such as that by Bush and Matthes (2016), warned that the 
GDP impact of Brexit would be between 1% and 5%. Subsequently, more estimates were 
made, all with negative economic consequences. Dinghra et al (2017), mentioned earlier, 
used a general equilibrium model to forecast different Brexit outcomes.  They foresaw 
declines in average income per capita of between 6.3% and 9.4% based on two scenarios, a 
Norway like deal (soft Brexit), and a Wold Trade Organization deal (hard Brexit). The 
Treasury’s own forecast, which included a third option which envisioned a comprehensive 
free trade agreement along the lines on the one with Canada. It evaluated the impact on GDP 
over a fifteen year time horizon. We refer to these three possibilities as scenario one, two and 
three respectively and model these using a GDP to stock ratio. We use the three scenarios in 
combination with opinion poll data to quantify the impact of changing Brexit risk premia. 
 
Literature 
Much of the literature of political risk focuses on expropriation and change of governments.   
There is far less on the effects of customs union, the benefits of which were exposed by Viner 
(1950). He suggests the impact is largely positive. This would suggest the impact of leaving 
is negative. Krueger (1997) expands on the distinction between Free Trade Areas and 
customs unions, arguing that a customs union is always Pareto optimal.  Supporting this, 
Baier and F (2007) quantified the impact of bilateral trade agreements, demonstrating that 
mutual trade can double within a decade. There is no literature on whether the reverse is true, 
but we contend that it is reasonable to infer there would be a negative trade related impact. 
 
Theory suggests that the economic implications of Brexit should be discounted in security 
prices.  In an efficient market, prices adjust rapidly to new information as demonstrated by 
numerous authors including Fama et al (1969).  With political information, we observe, in the 
spirit of Fama (1991) that market efficiency and equilibrium pricing are inseparable.  As 
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such, the focus of this paper is on the cross section of the expected returns based on the 
probabilistic prediction of the various Brexit out-comes. 
 
In the broader literature on political discourse, there has been much academic investigation 
into political events.  These are nicely summed up in Kobrin (1979) in his review and 
reconsideration of political risk.  It can be seen, from such an evaluation, that Brexit provides 
an additional level of uncertainty, namely the date and terms of the outcome. The uncertainty 
stems from policy decisions motivated by both economic and non economic objectives.  The 
costs associated with these decisions and uncertainty about future actions both result in asset 
price changes.   
 
The uncertainties are further exaggerated because Brexit is what DeSio et al (2016) would 
term a low yield issue.  In other words, an issue on which a political party does not gain 
advantage when its members are divided.  Indeed, as it turned out, Brexit proved a negative 
yield issue. 
 
Pastor and Veronesi (2102) investigated political uncertainty and the pricing of securities.  
They found that securities typically fell on the announcement of a policy change.  They also 
found that the magnitude of this decline and the jump in the risk premium was greater if there 
was greater uncertainty about government policy.  Pastor and Veronesi (2013) went on to 
further point out that this makes securities more volatile and more correlated.  This 
uncertainty, they argue, stems from the possible policy shocks which are to some extent 
orthogonal to economic shocks. 
 
Isolating political risk from other risk factors has presented challenges to prior researchers. 
One approach to identify such a risk premia is to investigate the variation of security price 
returns around elections.   Kelly et all (2016) pursued such an approach in the options market, 
finding that political uncertainty is priced into such instruments.  Another approach, as 
exampled by Gemmill (1992), is to test around opinion polls. We take the latter approach so 
as to capture a simple risk premia, reflecting the time varying nature of Brexit sentiment 
during our sample period. 
 
Our enquiry builds on the work of a number of academics, including Leblang and Mukherjee 
(2005), and Białkowski et al (2008), that have examined elections and the resulting volatility. 
The broad consensus of these studies is that narrower the result of an election, the greater the 
market volatility. We suggest this is an intuitive result as greater uncertainty typically results 
in asset price volatility. We also observe that the opinion polls during our sample period were 
close to evenly divided when taking into account the margin of error.  The way thinking is 
impacted by surveys, as identified by Ansolabegere and Schaffner (2014), make the 
measurement error particularly pertinent in this case.    
 
The link between GDP and equity returns has been the subject of much academic 
investigation.  We refer to Hassapis and Kalyvitis (2002), who show a significant causal 
relationship in the United Kingdom based on Vector Autoregressions and Granger causality 
tests. The findings of Dhingra et al (2016) suggest that the UK impact is larger than all other 
EU countries combined.  
 
On the currency side, Schiavo, (2008) investigated the correlation and endogeneity of 
currency areas, providing evidence that economic integration exerts a positive effect on 
output. After Mundell (1968), we observe that tariff preferences and terms of trade are 
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variables that affect exchange rates. We find this linkage in the movements of the Stirling 
cross rates. The observed reaction of asset markets, controlled for exogenous news flow, 
therefore represents a change in the Brexit risk premia.  We view the Brexit risk premia as a 
subset of country risk premia. 
 
 
Market data 
 
We used daily stock returns from Bloomberg based on the constituents of the FTSE 100, 
from the 1st of January 2016 to the 2nd of January 2019. The dataset comprises 41 sectors, the 
constituents of which were taken from the London Stock Exchange’s website.  
The FTSE 100 was chosen as it is the main indices in the United Kingdom and therefore 
arguably those that will be most impacted by Brexit. It represents the largest 100 companies 
by market capitalization. The FTSE 100 is generally seen to be market driven.  
 
We cleaned the data for public holidays and excluded stocks that were not present in the 
index for the entire sample period. Daily returns were calculated using continuous 
compounding returns method1. Excess returns were then generated by subtracting the risk-
free rate, our proxy being the a one-month UK treasury bill. 
 
We used daily currency returns from Bloomberg, principally on the Euro to Sterling cross 
exchange rate from the 1st of January 2016 to the 2nd of January 2019. Five other major 
trading currency rates were used to increase the sample size of the study, the US, Canadian 
and Australian Dollars, the Swiss Franc and the Japanese Yen.  
 
Examining the summary statistics, all currencies’ peak values for 2018 are lower than that of 
the full sample, but all currencies except the Euro show effectively consistent averages 
between 2018 and the whole sample period. This suggests that in 2018 Stirling was 
particularly weak against the Euro when compared to its performance against other 
currencies. We suggest this is potentially due in part to the Brexit process. 
 
Opinion poll data was sourced from WhatEUThinks, a site maintained by NatCen Social 
Research.  The data comprised of aggregated polls related to Brexit. The polls used were 
from YouGov that asked the question: “How well or badly do you think the government are 
doing at negotiating Britain’s exit from the EU?”. There were 76 polls conducted, with a 
frequency of approximately one every week. Summary statistics for the poll data can be seen 
in Exhibit 3.  
 
 
Exhibit 3.  Poll Summary Statistics 
 
  Very well Fairly well Fairly badly Very badly Don't know 
Max 2.0% 21.0% 35.0% 49.0% 16.0% 
Min 1.0% 11.0% 26.0% 30.0% 11.0% 
Average 1.4% 15.7% 30.4% 39.6% 13.1% 
 
1  𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝐿𝑛(
𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡−1
) Where  𝑅𝑖𝑡, the return for security i on day t, is equal to the natural log of the return index value 
today 𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡 , divided by the return index value on the preceding trading day 𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡−1. 
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Std Dev 0.0049 0.0272 0.0179 0.0445 0.0146 
 
Exhibit 3. Summary statistics for the poll data from YouGov, responses to the question “How well or badly do 
you think the government are doing at negotiating Britain’s exit from the EU?” Source: YouGov data.  
WhatEUThinks, a site maintained by NatCen Social Research.   
 
 
The polling time series was not run as a daily poll, meaning the time series contained some 
gaps. The results have been smoothed to account for the missing periods using a three-way 
moving average, creating a continuous set of data for the whole sample range. These were 
then aggregated so that responses were either approving or disapproving.  We suggest this 
approach is appropriate for comparison with continuous financial market time series.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
Our dataset included a rich pool of testable events.  In order to isolate the Brexit risk premia 
changes, we chose the draft withdrawal agreement as that proved to have the least noise in 
the surrounding period. This event involved an announcement that a Brexit deal had been 
reached between the UK Government and the European Union. It was announced in the 
afternoon of the 14th of November 2018. However, the following day the initially positive 
response was overshadowed by resistance from MPs from across the political spectrum. This 
resistance included several cabinet resignations and general doubt over the prospects of the 
deal being ratified by Parliament. This occurred on the first full day of trading after the 
announcement. As a result of this time differential, we selected the 15th November as the 
event day and the event period from the 12th to the 19th of November.  
 
We created values to reflect how GDP would likely change in each of three scenarios. These 
were detailed in an OECD report by Kierzenkowski et al (2016) (referred to as OECD 
henceforth), H.M. Treasury (2016) & Dhingra et al (2016).  These scenarios are then 
translated into stock price movements, labelled as scenario (1) No deal, (2) a Norway like 
deal and (3) a Canada like deal. 
 
A Monte Carlo Simulation is used to create an average outcome from the range of uncertain 
possibilities in the three scenarios. In this case it will be used to analyse the impact of various 
deals on the economy, in several situations where each deal is more likely. This is made to 
reflect an announcement from the government of which deal they are pursuing, or new 
information becoming public which changes the likelihood of each outcome. In order to 
create variation in the simulation, upper and lower bounds are placed on the amount that 
stock prices are permitted to jump in a single period, in this case 1.5% either way. The results 
are shown in Exhibit 4. 
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Exhibit 4. Monte Carlo outcomes of the three scenarios on the FTSE 100 Index 
 
 
  
 
Exhibit 4 shows the output from the Monte Carlo simulation for the Treasury predictions. It uses the FTSE 100 
value on the 14th of November as a starting point. Each simulation is made up of 1,000 estimates.  
 
 
 
The no deal scenario from the Monte Carlo analysis was clearly the worst outcome for the 
FTS 100. The Norwegian outcome gave the greatest uncertainty in terms of range of FTSE 
100 predictions. We contend that our event period captures the impact from the 
announcement within two days following the event day. We consider it short enough to limit 
the likelihood of other news impacting on the market. Any noise from other events would 
reduce the effectiveness of the analysis and potentially weaken the results. In examining news 
reports from the surrounding days, we found no other major systemic events that were likely 
to have impacted financial markets.  
  
No Deal 
Norway 
Canada 
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The estimation period around the event was selected as the 1st of October 2018 to the 9th of 
November. This provides just over one month of data, with a total of thirty trading days. 
These days were used to estimate the expected returns for the event window. While many 
other studies utilise a longer estimation window, often of around 100 days or more as 
explained by Mackinlay, (1997), the decision was taken that this would be detrimental due to 
contamination from other related events. The EU summit in Salzburg was held on the 19th & 
20th of September, where European leaders provided a firmer than expected resistance to the 
UK Government’s plans. This qualifies as a significant event which was not foreseen, and 
would bias the estimation window if included. We justify this based on Corrado & Zivney 
(1992) who find that short estimation periods, of around the length used in this study, lead to 
only a very small reduction in test performance for T-stats and non-parametric tests.  
 
 
Results 
 
We present our three economic scenarios in Exhibit 5. We apply a GDP to stock ratio (Panel 
1) in order to measure the Treasury (Panel 2), OECD (Panel 3), and Dhingra et al (Panel 4) 
impacts of the three scenarios. These show that whatever the scenario there was a negative 
expectation. 
 
Exhibit 5. Deal Outcome Multipliers 
 
 
Panel 1: GDP to Stock Ratio 
  Value 
UK GDP 
 (Millions) 
£2,033,623 
FTSE 350 Capitalisation 
 (Millions) 
£2,098,874 
GDP/ Stock Capitalisation 
Ratio 
0.9689 
 
Panel 2: Treasury Multiplier   
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Treasury impact 
value 
-7.5 -3.8 -6.2 
Stock adjusted 
value 
-7.26675 -3.68182 -6.00718 
1- Stock 
Adjusted value 
(Multiplier) 
0.9273325 0.9631818 0.9399282 
    
Panel 3: OECD 
Multiplier    
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
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OECD impact 
value 
-7.7 -2.7 -5.1 
Stock adjusted 
value 
-7.46053 -2.61603 -4.94139 
1- Stock 
Adjusted value 
(Multiplier) 
0.9253947 0.9738397 0.9505861 
    
Panel 4: Dhingra et al 
Multiplier:    
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Dhingra et al 
impact value 
-3.1 -0.53 -1.815 
Stock adjusted 
value 
-3.00359 -0.513517 -1.7585535 
1- Stock 
Adjusted value 
(Multiplier) 
96.99641 99.486483 98.241447 
Exhibit 1 shows the calculation of the GDP to stock market capitalisation ratio, and Panel 2 shows the deal 
outcome values and their multiplication with the GDP to stock capitalisation ratio. 
 
While this event study has been referring to the date in question as the deal announcement, it 
should be recalled that the real reaction from the markets was in response to MP’s reaction to 
the deal, which put the future of the agreement into doubt. Therefore, these results effectively 
show how the market reacted when the likelihood of a highly integrational deal decreased, 
and the probability of a disorderly exit such as a no deal situation increased. The percentage 
values of how much probability changed by is a highly subjective one, and so translating the 
change directly into the proportional likelihoods will not be attempted here. 
 
 
 
Exhibit 6 
Regression Summary Statistics 
 
Panel 1: FTSE 
100    
  Max Min Average Std Dev 
Alpha 0.0054 -0.0083 -0.0001 0.0025 
Beta 2.6314 -1.0491 1.0621 0.6168 
 
Panel 2: FTSE 100 Referendum   
  Max Min Average Std Dev 
Alpha 0.0057 -0.0067 0.0002 0.0018 
Beta 3.7553 0.3755 1.0240 0.5278 
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Panel 3: 
Currency 
  Max Min 
Averag
e 
Std 
Dev 
Alpha 
0.050
8 
-
0.003
5 
0.0199 
0.016
7 
Beta 
0.006
0 
-
0.072
4 
-
0.0283 
0.024
2 
  
 
Exhibit 6. shows summary outputs from all the regression parameters calculated for the market model. Average 
values are used for the market model assumptions.  
 
 
We reviewed the results using the market model with the regression results shown in Exhibit 
6. Average Abnormal Returns (AAR)2 were then calculated by averaging the abnormal 
returns for all of the days in the event period, and the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
(CAAR)3 also calculated for several groups within the event period. Significance tests were 
the used for both the AARs and the CAARs to evaluate whether the abnormal results were 
significantly different from zero.  
 
The tests provided T-stats and P-values for all values. These are shown in Exhibit 7. These 
were calculated using two methods, the first uses the standard deviation of the time series of 
average residuals from the estimation window4 as in Kothari & Warner (1997); the second 
uses the standard deviation of abnormal returns from the event window, referred to as the 
cross-sectional method5 (Barber & Lyon, 1997). Kothari & Warner (1997) find that using the 
standard deviation of the estimation window, as in the time series method of T-stat 1, can 
lead to over-rejection of the null hypothesis (type one error). Barber and Lyon (1997) find a 
similar result suggesting that the time series method may underestimate the volatility that 
makes up the T-stat calculation.  
 
 
2 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  the average of 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡, where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return for firm i in period t,  
3 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2 =  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ the average of all CARs, with CAR being the Cumulative abnormal return for a firm, 
calculated by: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡1 . CAR is the sum of abnormal returns from days t1 to t2 for firm i.   
4 𝑇 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 1 (𝐴𝐴𝑅) =  
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝜎(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
 Calculated by the AAR over the standard deviation of AARs in the 
estimation window.  
For CAARs : 𝑇 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 1 (𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅) =  
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2
𝜎(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛∗ √𝑇)
 Where T is the number of days in the CAAR. 
5  𝑇 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 2 (𝐴𝐴𝑅) =  
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝜎(𝐴𝑅𝑡)
 Which is the 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 divided by the standard deviation of abnormal returns for the 
period the AAR is being calculated for.  
For CAARs: 𝑇 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 2 (𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅) =  
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2
 𝜎(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 ÷ √𝑁)
 The value of the CAAR, over the standard deviation of the CAR 
divided by the square root of N, the number of firms in the sample. 
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Exhibit 7. FTSE 100 Results 
 
 
Market 
Model   
Panel 1: AAR   
Day AAR T-stat 1 T-stat 2 
-3 -0.0049 
-1.11 
(0.2694) 
-2.44 
(0.0167) 
-2 0.0058* 
1.32 
(0.1915) 
2.85 
(0.0054) 
-1 0.0039* 
0.88 
(0.3794) 
2.04 
(0.0444) 
0 -0.0126* 
-2.87 
(0.005) 
-3.66 
(0.0004) 
1 0.0019 
0.44 
(0.6609) 
1.29 
(0.1993) 
2 -0.0024 
-0.54 
(0.5904) 
-1.91 
(0.0595) 
    
Market 
Model   
Panel 2: 
CAAR   
Day CAAR T-stat 1 T-stat 2 
(-3,0) -0.0078 
-0.89 
(0.3738) 
-1.53 
(0.1301) 
(-2,2) -0.0034 
-0.35 
(0.7292) 
-0.72 
(0.4731) 
(-1,1) -0.0068 
-0.9 
(0.3726) 
-1.56 
(0.1228) 
(0,1) -0.0106 
-1.72 
(0.0883) 
-2.62 
(0.0103) 
(0,2) -0.0130* 
-1.72 
(0.0891) 
-3.14 
(0.0023) 
(1,2) -0.0004 
-0.07 
(0.9437) 
-0.25 
(0.8064) 
(-3,2) -0.0083 
-0.77 
(0.4429) 
-1.46 
(0.1472) 
 
Exhibit 7. AAR and CAAR results for the full FTSE 100 for the November event, T-stat 1 is calculated using 
estimation window standard deviation, and T-stat 2 using event window standard deviation. P-values are shown 
in parenthesis for all t-stats. Key figures indicated by *. 
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When analysing just the FTSE 100, some significant results are present. Evaluating the 
market model as shown in Exhibit 7, there is a significant negative deviation on AAR on day 
zero, with a magnitude of 1.26% significant at 95%. The days following do not have any 
significant deviation. This is the case when looking at both T-stats (the estimation residuals 
and event residuals). Day -3 shows a negative significant deviation and days -2 & -1 both 
show positive significant results. For these days they are only significant under the 2nd T-stat 
however, providing not as strong a result as the day 0 value.  
 
 
The day 0 result carries through into the event CAAR’s, with periods (0,1) & (0,2) showing 
positive deviations significant to 95%, reaching 99% significance for (0,2). These results 
appear to be driven entirely by the movements on day 0, with the magnitude being effectively 
identical for the day 0 AAR and the (0,2) CAAR. The significance of the CAAR’s is less 
robust than that of the AAR as it only appears significant when using the cross-sectional T-
stat method.   
 
In addition to the equity market analysis, a study of the foreign exchange markets was carried 
out to expand the reach of the study. The Brexit process has impacted substantially on the 
currency. A currency return was required in order to create the expected return values. Unlike 
with the stock market analysis, there is no market return benchmark to use here so one had to 
be created. This was done by averaging the returns on several currencies to create an index 
return, following the methods of Kwok & Brooks (1990), who use the foreign exchange asset 
pricing model of Roll & Solnik (1977).  
 
Exhibit 9. Estimation and Event Window Volatility 
 
Panel 1: Variance     
   100  Currency Euro 
Estimation  0.000367  2.48E-05 1.27E-05 
Event  0.000481  9.03E-05 6.48E-05 
      
Panel 2: Std Dev     
Estimation  0.0192  0.0050 0.0036 
Event  0.0219  0.0095 0.0081 
      
Panel 3: Event Window Difference   
Event % 
increase 
 14.56%*  90.73%* 126.13%* 
      
Panel 4: Referendum Variance    
   100  Currency Euro 
Estimation  0.0003  5.75E-05 4.22E-05 
Event  0.002742  0.000901 0.000598 
      
Panel 5: Referendum Std Dev    
Estimation  0.0173  0.0076 0.0065 
Event  0.0524  0.0300 0.0245 
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Panel 6: Referendum Event Window Difference  
Event % 
increase 
 202.19%*  295.79%* 276.46%* 
 This table shows the variance for the estimation and event window for each study carried out, then takes the 
square root of this value to find standard deviation. Panel three shows the percentage difference in standard 
deviation from the estimation window to the event. Key values indicated by *. 
 
Currency analysis presents another challenge when compared to stocks, as currency holdings 
will earn interest over bank holiday dates, which may create a difference in values on the 
following trading day. Kwok & Brooks (1990) also investigated this and find that there is a 
slight change in results. As such, we conclude that it is small enough to be reasonably left out 
of our analysis. We present the Currency sign test in Exhibit 7. 
 
Exhibit 8. Currency Sign Test 
 
 
Period 
Median 
CAR 
N +ve 
CARS 
Fraction 
+ve 
Sign 
Test 
P-value 
(-3,0) -0.0708 0 0.30 -1.13 0.3745 
(-2,2) -0.0585 0  -1.13 0.3745 
(-1,1) -0.0448 0  -1.13 0.3745 
(0,1) -0.0648 0  -1.13 0.3745 
(0,2) -0.0325 1  -0.13 0.9057 
(1,2) -0.1034 0  -1.13 0.3745 
(-3,2) -0.0818 0   -1.13 0.3745 
      
 
Exhibit 8.  shows the results from the currency study sign test. All CAARs used in the study are shown here. 
The Fraction +ve column refers to the fraction of values within the estimation window which are positive.  
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Our results indicate that Brexit uncertainty was not immediately priced in, as can be seen 
through the significance of several CAARs, most often (0,1). This represents an inefficiency 
in capital markets. The full effect of the event takes multiple days to be fully included in 
prices. Theory suggests the effect should be more immediate.  This further suggests that the 
informational transmission nature of political risk premia is different from other sources of 
financial risk, an important contribution in understanding the nature of capital asset pricing.  
We further contend that the observed uncertainty is a subset of Country risk premia and as 
such the speed of dissemination of political news has market importance, 
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Our study also provides valuable information for any country looking to undertake a similar 
departure from the EU. It shows the correlation between the deal outcomes and market 
reaction, and this reaction should be added into any cost-benefit analysis of the potential 
divorce process. For most other EU countries, the relationship to the EU will be different, 
most obviously as they are likely to be using the Euro as their currency. Therefore, the 
reaction of this market will be less important as there is no rate between the country and the 
EU. As a result, more of the reaction may be focused onto the domestic stock market, while 
potentially also impacting other domestic markets.  
 
Our key takeaway is that events which increase the likelihood of a dramatic break in trading 
relationships are perceived negatively, and sectors with high levels of cross border integration 
are likely to be impacted.  Brexit risk, as a subset of the country risk premia, can be useful in 
wider political risk analysis during future elections. 
 
Improving political information dissemination would help with increasing the speed that 
information is included in prices. In many of the referendum and sector results, the 
information is not fully priced in until multiple days have passed after the event. By 
improving this process, prices would update more quickly, making the market more efficient.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We investigated the uncertainty surrounding changing sentiment to Brexit on the FTSE 100 
and the Pound.  Using an event study, we isolate exogenous effects on the stock and currency 
markets. We use adapted continuous poll data with continuous financial time series to 
evaluate the change in risk premia.   
 
Our results are applicable for any major political event where opinion is divided, issue yield 
is low or negative and the outcome uncertain. They are relevant in such circumstances where 
unexpected election results or major policy shifts occur. We consider our findings useful for 
countries considering leaving the EU, detailing what the financial impact of this decision 
would be. This is because such events tend to happen in a continuum, rather than as a single 
event shock.   
 
We find that a Brexit effect was evident as a subset of country risk premia. The delay in 
market adjustment to opinion poll changes suggests that markets are less efficient at 
discounting change in political sentiment than financial theory proposes.   
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